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Abstract Time-asymmetric behavior as embodied in the second law of ther-
modynamics is observed in individual macroscopic systems. It can be under-
stood as arising naturally from time-symmetric microscopic laws when ac-
count is taken of a) the great disparity between microscopic and macroscopic
scales, b) a low entropy state of the early universe, and c) the fact that what
we observe is the behavior of systems coming from such an initial state—not
all possible systems. The explanation of the origin of the second law based
on these ingredients goes back to Maxwell, Thomson and particularly Boltz-
mann. Common alternate explanations, such as those based on the ergodic
or mixing properties of probability distributions (ensembles) already present
for chaotic dynamical systems having only a few degrees of freedom or on
the impossibility of having a truly isolated system, are either unnecessary,
misguided or misleading. Specific features of macroscopic evolution, such
as the diffusion equation, do however depend on the dynamical instability
(deterministic chaos) of trajectories of isolated macroscopic systems.
The extensions of these classical notions to the quantum world is in many
ways fairly direct. It does however also bring in some new problems. These
will be discussed but not resolved.
1 Introduction
Let me start by stating clearly that I am not going to discuss here—much
less claim to resolve—the many complex issues, philosophical and physical,
concerning the nature of time, from the way we perceive it to the way it
enters into the space-time structure in relativistic theories. I will also not try
to philosophize about the “true” nature of probability. My goal here, as in
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my previous articles [1, 2] on this subject, is much more modest.a I will take
(our everyday notions of) space, time and probability as primitive undefined
concepts and try to clarify the many conceptual and mathematical problems
encountered in going from a time symmetric Hamiltonian microscopic dy-
namics to a time asymmetric macroscopic one, as given for example by the
diffusion equation. I will also take it for granted that every bit of macroscopic
matter is composed of an enormous number of quasi-autonomous units, called
atoms (or molecules).
The atoms, taken to be the basic entities making up these macroscopic
objects, will be simplified to the point of caricature: they will be treated, to
quote Feynman [3], as “little particles that move around in perpetual motion,
attracting each other when they are a little distance apart, but repelling upon
being squeezed into one another.” This crude picture of atoms (a refined ver-
sion of that held by some ancient Greek philosophers) moving according to
non-relativistic classical Hamiltonian equations contains the essential qual-
itative and even quantitative ingredients of macroscopic irreversibility. To
accord with our understanding of microscopic reality it must, of course, be
modified to take account of quantum mechanics. This raises further issues
for the question of irreversibility which will be discussed in section 9.
Much of what I have to say is a summary and elaboration of the work done
over a century ago, when the problem of reconciling time asymmetric macro-
scopic behavior with the time symmetric microscopic dynamics became a
central issue in physics. To quote from Thomson’s (later Lord Kelvin) beau-
tiful and highly recommended 1874 article [4], [5] “The essence of Joule’s
discovery is the subjection of physical [read thermal] phenomena to [micro-
scopic] dynamical law. If, then, the motion of very particle of matter in the
universe were precisely reversed at any instant, the course of nature would
be simply reversed for ever after. The bursting bubble of foam at the foot of
a waterfall would reunite and descend into the water . . . . Physical processes,
on the other hand, are irreversible: for example, the friction of solids, con-
duction of heat, and diffusion. Nevertheless, the principle of dissipation of
energy [irreversible behavior] is compatible with a molecular theory in which
each particle is subject to the laws of abstract dynamics.”
aThe interested reader may wish to look at the three book reviews of which are con-
tained in [1e], [1f]. These books attempt to deal with some fundamental questions about
time. As for the primitive notion of probability I have in mind something like this: the
probability that when you next check your mail box you will find a package with a million
dollars in it is very small, c.f. section 3.
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1.1 Formulation of Problem
Formally the problem considered by Thomson in the context of Newtonian
theory, the “theory of everything” at that time, is as follows: The complete
microscopic (or micro) state of a classical system of N particles is represented
by a point X in its phase space Γ, X = (r1,p1, r2,p2, ..., rN ,pN), ri and pi
being the position and momentum (or velocity) of the ith particle. When
the system is isolated its evolution is governed by Hamiltonian dynamics
with some specified Hamiltonian H(X) which we will assume for simplicity
to be an even function of the momenta. Given H(X), the microstate X(t0),
at time t0, determines the microstate X(t) at all future and past times t
during which the system will be or was isolated: X(t) = Tt−t0X(t0). Let
X(t0) and X(t0 + τ), with τ positive, be two such microstates. Reversing
(physically or mathematically) all velocities at time t0 + τ , we obtain a new
microstate. If we now follow the evolution for another interval τ we find that
the new microstate at time t0+2τ is just RX(t0), the microstate X(t0) with
all velocities reversed: RX = (r1,−p1, r2,−p2, ..., rN ,−pN). Hence if there
is an evolution, i.e. a trajectory X(t), in which some property of the system,
specified by a function f(X(t)), behaves in a certain way as t increases, then
if f(X) = f(RX) there is also a trajectory in which the property evolves
in the time reversed direction. Thus, for example, if particle densities get
more uniform as time increases, in a way described by the diffusion equation,
then since the density profile is the same for X and RX there is also an
evolution in which the density gets more nonuniform. So why is one type
of evolution, the one consistent with an entropy increase in accord with the
“second law”, common and the other never seen? The difficulty is illustrated
by the impossibility of time ordering of the snapshots in Fig. 1 using solely
the microscopic dynamical laws: the above time symmetry implies that if (a,
b, c, d) is a possible ordering so is (d, c, b, a).
1.2 Resolution of Problem
The explanation of this apparent paradox, due to Thomson, Maxwell and
Boltzmann, as described in references [1]–[17], which I will summarize in
this article, shows that not only is there no conflict between reversible mi-
croscopic laws and irreversible macroscopic behavior, but, as clearly pointed
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Figure 1: A sequence of “snapshots”, a, b, c, d taken at times ta, tb, tc, td, each
representing a macroscopic state of a system, say a fluid with two “differently
colored” atoms or a solid in which the shading indicates the local temperature.
How would you order this sequence in time?
out by Boltzmann in his later writingsb, there are extremely strong reasons to
expect the latter from the former. These reasons involve several interrelated
ingredients which together provide the required distinction between micro-
scopic and macroscopic variables and explain the emergence of definite time
asymmetric behavior in the evolution of the latter despite the total absence
of such asymmetry in the dynamics of the former. They are: a) the great
disparity between microscopic and macroscopic scales, b) the fact that the
events we observe in our world are determined not only by the microscopic
dynamics, but also by the initial conditions of our system, which, as we
shall see later, in section 6, are very much related to the initial conditions
of our universe, and c) the fact that it is not every microscopic state of a
macroscopic system that will evolve in accordance with the entropy increase
predicted by the second law, but only the “majority” of such states—a ma-
jority which however becomes so overwhelming when the number of atoms in
the system becomes very large that irreversible behavior becomes effectively
a certainty. To make the last statement complete we shall have to specify
the assignment of weights, or probabilities, to different microstates consistent
bBoltzmann’s early writings on the subject are sometimes unclear, wrong, and even
contradictory. His later writings, however, are generally very clear and right on the money
(even if a bit verbose for Maxwell’s taste, c.f. [8].) The presentation here is not intended
to be historical.
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with a given macrostate. Note, however, that since we are concerned with
events which have overwhelming probability, many different assignments are
equivalent and there is no need to worry about them unduly. There is how-
ever, as we shall see later, a “natural” choice based on phase space volume
(or dimension of Hilbert space in quantum mechanics). These considerations
enabled Boltzmann to define the entropy of a macroscopic system in terms
of its microstate and to relate its change, as expressed by the second law,
to the evolution of the system’s microstate. We detail below how the above
explanation works by describing first how to specify the macrostates of a
macroscopic system. It is in the time evolution of these macrostates that we
observe irreversible behavior [1]–[17].
1.3 Macrostates
To describe the macroscopic state of a system of N atoms in a box V , say
N & 1020, with the volume of V , denoted by |V |, satisfying |V | & Nl3, where
l is a typical atomic length scale, we make use of a much cruder description
than that provided by the microstate X , a point in the 6N dimensional phase
space Γ = V N ⊗R3N . We shall denote by M such a macroscopic description
or macrostate. As an example we may take M to consist of the specification,
to within a given accuracy, of the energy and number of particles in each
half of the box V . A more refined macroscopic description would divide V
into K cells, where K is large but still K << N , and specify the number of
particles, the momentum, and the amount of energy in each cell, again with
some tolerance. For many purposes it is convenient to consider cells which
are small on the macroscopic scale yet contain many atoms. This leads to
a description of the macrostate in terms of smooth particle, momentum and
energy densities, such as those used in the Navier-Stokes equations [18], [19].
An even more refined description is obtained by considering a smoothed out
density f(r,p) in the six-dimensional position and momentum space such
as enters the Boltzmann equation for dilute gases [17]. (For dense systems
this needs to be supplemented by the positional potential energy density; see
footnote d and reference [2] for details.)
Clearly M is determined by X (we will thus write M(X)) but there are
many X ’s (in fact a continuum) which correspond to the same M . Let
ΓM be the region in Γ consisting of all microstates X corresponding to a
given macrostate M and denote by |ΓM | = (N !h
3N )−1
∫
ΓM
ΠNi=1dridpi, its
symmetrized 6N dimensional Liouville volume (in units of h3N ).
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1.4 Time Evolution of Macrostates: An Example
Consider a situation in which a gas of N atoms with energy E (with some
tolerance) is initially confined by a partition to the left half of of the box V ,
and suppose that this constraint is removed at time ta, see Fig. 1. The phase
space volume available to the system for times t > ta is then fantastically
enlargedc compared to what it was initially, roughly by a factor of 2N .
Let us now consider the macrostate of this gas as given byM =
(
NL
N
, EL
E
)
,
the fraction of particles and energy in the left half of V (within some small
tolerance). The macrostate at time ta,M = (1, 1), will be denoted by Ma.
The phase-space region |Γ| = ΣE , available to the system for t > ta, i.e., the
region in which H(X) ∈ (E,E + δE), δE << E, will contain new macro-
states, corresponding to various fractions of particles and energy in the left
half of the box, with phase space volumes very large compared to the ini-
tial phase space volume available to the system. We can then expect (in
the absence of any obstruction, such as a hidden conservation law) that as
the phase point X evolves under the unconstrained dynamics and explores
the newly available regions of phase space, it will with very high probability
enter a succession of new macrostates M for which |ΓM | is increasing. The
set of all the phase points Xt, which at time ta were in ΓMa, forms a region
TtΓMa whose volume is, by Liouville’s Theorem, equal to |ΓMa|. The shape
of TtΓMa will however change with t and as t increases TtΓMa will increas-
ingly be contained in regions ΓM corresponding to macrostates with larger
and larger phase space volumes |ΓM |. This will continue until almost all the
phase points initially in ΓMa are contained in ΓMeq , with Meq the system’s
unconstrained macroscopic equilibrium state. This is the state in which ap-
proximately half the particles and half the energy will be located in the left
half of the box, Meq = (
1
2
, 1
2
) i.e. NL/N and EL/E will each be in an interval(
1
2
− ǫ, 1
2
+ ǫ
)
, N−1/2 << ǫ << 1.
Meq is characterized, in fact defined, by the fact that it is the unique
macrostate, among all the Mα, for which |ΓMeq |/|ΣE| ≃ 1, where |ΣE | is
the total phase space volume available under the energy constraint H(X) ∈
(E,E+δE). (Here the symbol ≃ means equality when N →∞.) That there
exists a macrostate containing almost all of the microstates in ΣE is a conse-
quence of the law of large numbers [20], [18]. The fact that N is enormously
cIf the system contains 1 mole of gas then the volume ratio of the unconstrained phase
space region to the constrained one is far larger than the ratio of the volume of the known
universe to the volume of one proton.
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large for macroscope systems is absolutely critical for the existence of ther-
modynamic equilibrium states for any reasonable definition of macrostates,
e.g. for any ǫ, in the above example such that N−1/2 << ǫ << 1. Indeed
thermodynamics does not apply (is even meaningless) for isolated systems
containing just a few particles, c.f. Onsager [21] and Maxwell quote in the
next section [22]. Nanosystems are interesting and important intermediate
cases which I shall however not discuss here; see related discussion about
computer simulations in footnote e.
After reachingMeq we will (mostly) see only small fluctuations inNL(t)/N
and EL(t)/E, about the value
1
2
: typical fluctuations in NL and EL being
of the order of the square root of the number of particles involved [18]. (Of
course if the system remains isolated long enough we will occasionally also
see a return to the initial macrostate—the expected time for such a Poincare´
recurrence is however much longer than the age of the universe and so is
of no practical relevance when discussing the approach to equilibrium of a
macroscopic system [6], [8].)
As already noted earlier the scenario in which |ΓM(X(t))| increase with
time for the Ma shown in Fig.1 cannot be true for all microstates X ⊂ ΓMa .
There will of necessity beX ’s in ΓMa which will evolve for a certain amount of
time into microstates X(t) ≡ Xt such that |ΓM(Xt)| < |ΓMa|, e.g. microstates
X ∈ ΓMa which have all velocities directed away from the barrier which was
lifted at ta. What is true however is that the subset B of such “bad” initial
states has a phase space volume which is very very small compared to that
of ΓMa . This is what I mean when I say that entropy increasing behavior is
typical; a more extensive discussion of typicality is given later.
2 Boltzmann’s Entropy
The end result of the time evolution in the above example, that of the frac-
tion of particles and energy becoming and remaining essentially equal in the
two halves of the container when N is large enough (and ‘exactly equal’ when
N →∞), is of course what is predicted by the second law of thermodynam-
ics. According to this law the final state of an isolated system with specified
constraints on the energy, volume, and mole number is one in which the
entropy, a measurable macroscopic quantity of equilibrium systems, defined
on a purely operational level by Claussius, has its maximum. (In practice
one also fixes additional constraints, e.g. the chemical combination of nitro-
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gen and oxygen to form complex molecules is ruled out when considering,
for example, the dew point of air in the ‘equilibrium’ state of air at nor-
mal temperature and pressure, c.f. [21]. There are, of course, also very long
lived metastable states, e.g. glasses, which one can, for many purposes, treat
as equilibrium states even though their entropy is not maximal. I will ig-
nore these complications here.) In our example this thermodynamic entropy
would be given by S = VLs
(
NL
VL
, EL
VL
)
+ VRs
(
NR
VR
, ER
VR
)
defined for all equilib-
rium states in separate boxes VL and VR with given values of NL, NR, EL, ER.
When VL and VR are united to form V, S is maximized subject to the con-
straint of EL + ER = E and of NL +NR = N .
It was Boltzmann’s great insight to connect the second law with the above
phase space volume considerations by making the observation that for a dilute
gas log |ΓMeq | is proportional, up to terms negligible in the size of the system,
to the thermodynamic entropy of Clausius. Boltzmann then extended his
insight about the relation between thermodynamic entropy and log |ΓMeq | to
all macroscopic systems; be they gas, liquid or solid. This provided for the
first time a microscopic definition of the operationally measurable entropy of
macroscopic systems in equilibrium.
Having made this connection Boltzmann then generalized it to define
an entropy also for macroscopic systems not in equilibrium. That is, he
associated with each microscopic state X of a macroscopic system a number
SB which depends only on M(X) given, up to multiplicative and additive
constants (which can depend on N), by
SB(X) = SB(M(X)) (1a)
with
SB(M) = k log |ΓM |, (1b)
which, following O. Penrose [13], I shall call the Boltzmann entropy of a
classical system: |ΓM | is defined in section (1.3). N. B. I have deliberately
written (1) as two equations to emphasize their logical independence which
will be useful for the discussion of quantum systems in section 9.
Boltzmann then used phase space arguments, like those given above, to
explain (in agreement with the ideas of Maxwell and Thomson) the obser-
vation, embodied in the second law of thermodynamics, that when a con-
straint is lifted, an isolated macroscopic system will evolve toward a state
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with greater entropy.d In effect Boltzmann argued that due to the large dif-
ferences in the sizes of ΓM , SB(Xt) = k log |ΓM(Xt)| will typically increase
in a way which explains and describes qualitatively the evolution towards
equilibrium of macroscopic systems.
These very large differences in the values of |ΓM | for different M come
from the very large number of particles (or degrees of freedom) which con-
tribute, in an (approximately) additive way, to the specification of macro-
states. This is also what gives rise to typical or almost sure behavior. Typi-
cal, as used here, means that the set of microstates corresponding to a given
macrostate M for which the evolution leads to a macroscopic increase (or
non-decrease) in the Boltzmann entropy during some fixed macroscopic time
period τ occupies a subset of ΓM whose Liouville volume is a fraction of |ΓM |
which goes very rapidly (exponentially) to one as the number of atoms in
the system increases. The fraction of “bad” microstates, which lead to an
entropy decrease, thus goes to zero as N →∞.
Typicality is what distinguishes macroscopic irreversibility from the weak
approach to equilibrium of probability distributions (ensembles) of systems
with good ergodic properties having only a few degrees of freedom, e.g. two
hard spheres in a cubical box. While the former is manifested in a typical
evolution of a single macroscopic system the latter does not correspond to
any appearance of time asymmetry in the evolution of an individual system.
Maxwell makes clear the importance of the separation between microscopic
and macroscopic scales when he writes [22]: “the second law is drawn from
our experience of bodies consisting of an immense number of molecules. ... it
is continually being violated, ..., in any sufficiently small group of molecules ...
. As the number ... is increased ... the probability of a measurable variation
... may be regarded as practically an impossibility.” This is also made
dWhen M specifies a state of local equilibrium, SB(X) agrees up to negligible terms,
with the “hydrodynamic entropy”. For systems far from equilibrium the appropriate def-
inition of M and thus of SB can be more problematical. For a dilute gas (with specified
kinetic energy and negligible potential energy) in which M is specified by the smoothed
empirical density f(r,v) of atoms in the six dimensional position and velocity space,
SB(X) = −k
∫
f(r,v) log f(r,v)drdv (see end of Section 4). This identification is, how-
ever, invalid when the potential energy is not negligible and one has to add to f(r,v)
also information about the energy density. This is discussed in detail in [2]. Boltzmann’s
famous H theorem derived from his eponymous equation for dilute gases is thus an ex-
pression of the second law applied to the macrostate specified by f . It was also argued in
[2] that such an H theorem must hold whenever there is a deterministic equation for the
macrovariables of an isolated system.
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Figure 2: Time evolution of a system of 900 particles all interacting via the
same cutoff Lennard-Jones pair potential using integer arithmetic. Half of
the particles are colored white, the other half black. All velocities are reversed
at t = 20, 000. The system then retraces its path and the initial state is fully
recovered. From Levesque and Verlet, Ref. [23].
very clear by Onsager in [21] and should be contrasted with the confusing
statements found in many books that thermodynamics can be applied to a
single isolated particle in a box, c.f. footnote i.
On the other hand, because of the exponential increase of the phase space
volume with particle number, even a system with only a few hundred par-
ticles, such as is commonly used in molecular dynamics computer simula-
tions, will, when started in a nonequilibrium ‘macrostate’ M , with ‘random’
X ∈ ΓM , appear to behave like a macroscopic system.
e This will be so even
when integer arithmetic is used in the simulations so that the system behaves
as a truly isolated one; when its velocities are reversed the system retraces
its steps until it comes back to the initial state (with reversed velocities),
after which it again proceeds (up to very long Poincare recurrence times) in
the typical way, see section 5 and Figs. 2 and 3 taken from [23] and [24].
We might take as a summary of such insights in the late part of the
nineteenth century the statement by Gibbs [25] quoted by Boltzmann (in a
German translation) on the cover of his book Lectures on Gas Theory II: [7],
eAfter all, the likelihood of hitting, in the course of say one thousand tries, something
which has probability of order 2−N is, for all practical purposes, the same, whether N is a
hundred or 1023. Of course the fluctuation in SB both along the path towards equilibrium
and in equilibrium will be larger when N is small, c.f. [2b].
10
Figure 3: Time evolution of a reversible cellular automaton lattice gas using
integer arithmetic. Figures a) and c) show the mean velocity, figures b) and
d) the entropy. The mean velocity decays with time and the entropy increases
up to t = 600 when there is a reversal of all velocities. The system then
retraces its path and the initial state is fully recovered in figures a) and b).
In the bottom figures there is a small error in the reversal at t = 600. While
such an error has no appreciable effect on the initial evolution it effectively
prevents any recovery of the initial state. The entropy, on the scale of the
figure, just remains at its maximum value. This shows the instability of the
reversed path. From Nadiga et al. Ref. [24].
“In other words, the impossibility of an uncompensated decrease of entropy
seems to be reduced to an improbability.”
3 The Use of Probabilities
As already noted, typical here means overwhelmingly probable with respect
to a measure which assigns (at least approximately) equal weights to regions
of equal phase space volume within ΓM or, loosely speaking, to different
microstates consistent with the “initial” macrostate M . (This is also what
was meant earlier by the ‘random’ choice of an initial X ∈ ΓM in the com-
puter simulations.) In fact, any mathematical statement about probable or
improbable behavior of a physical system has to refer to some agreed upon
measure (probability distribution). It is, however, very hard (perhaps im-
possible) to formulate precisely what one means, as a statement about the
real world, by an assignment of exact numerical values of probabilities (let
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alone rigorously justify any particular one) in our context. It is therefore
not so surprising that this use of probabilities, and particularly the use of
typicality for explaining the origin of the apparently deterministic second
law, was very difficult for many of Boltzmann’s contemporaries, and even for
some people today, to accept. (Many text books on statistical mechanics are
unfortunately either silent or confusing on this very important point.) This
was clearly very frustrating to Boltzmann as it is also to me, see [1b, 1c]. I
have not found any better way of expressing this frustration than Boltzmann
did when he wrote, in his second reply to Zermelo in 1897 [6] “The applica-
bility of probability theory to a particular case cannot of course be proved
rigorously. ... Despite this, every insurance company relies on probability
theory. ... It is even more valid [here], on account of the huge number of
molecules in a cubic millimetre... The assumption that these rare cases are
not observed in nature is not strictly provable (nor is the entire mechanical
picture itself) but in view of what has been said it is so natural and obvious,
and so much in agreement with all experience with probabilities ... [that]
... It is completely incomprehensible to me [my italics] how anyone can see
a refutation of the applicability of probability theory in the fact that some
other argument shows that exceptions must occur now and then over a period
of eons of time; for probability theory itself teaches just the same thing.”
The use of probabilities in the Maxwell-Thomson-Boltzmann explanation
of irreversible macroscopic behavior is as Ruelle notes “simple but subtle”
[14]. They introduce into the laws of nature notions of probability, which,
certainly at that time, were quite alien to the scientific outlook. Physical laws
were supposed to hold without any exceptions, not just almost always and
indeed no exceptions were (or are) known to the second law as a statement
about the actual behavior of isolated macroscopic systems; nor would we
expect any, as Richard Feynman [15] rather conservatively says, “in a million
years”. The reason for this, as already noted, is that for a macroscopic
system the fraction (in terms of the Liouville volume) of the microstates
in a macrostate M for which the evolution leads to macrostates M ′ with
SB(M
′) ≥ SB(M) is so close to one (in terms of their Liouville volume) that
such behavior is exactly what should be seen to “always” happen. Thus in
Fig. 1 the sequence going from left to right is typical for a phase point in ΓMa
while the one going from right to left has probability approaching zero with
respect to a uniform distribution in ΓMd, when N , the number of particles
(or degrees of freedom) in the system, is sufficiently large. The situation can
be quite different when N is small as noted in the last section: see Maxwell
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quote there.
Note that Boltzmann’s explanation of why SB(Mt) is never seen to de-
crease with t does not really require the assumption that over very long
periods of time a macroscopic system should be found in every region ΓM ,
i.e. in every macroscopic states M , for a fraction of time exactly equal to the
ratio of |ΓM | to the total phase space volume specified by its energy. This
latter behavior, embodied for example in Einstein’s formula
Prob{M} ∼ exp[SB(M)− Seq] (2)
for fluctuation in equilibrium sytems, with probability there interpreted as
the fraction of time which such a system will spend in ΓM , can be considered
as a mild form of the ergodic hypothesis, mild because it is only applied to
those regions of the phase space representing macrostates ΓM . This seems
very plausible in the absence of constants of the motion which decompose the
energy surface into regions with different macroscopic states. It appears even
more reasonable when we take into account the lack of perfect isolation in
practice which will be discussed later. Its implication for small fluctuations
from equilibrium is certainly consistent with observations. In particular when
the exponent in (2) is expanded in a Taylor series and only quadratic terms
are kept, we obtain a Gaussian distribution for normal (small) fluctuations
from equilibrium. Eq.(2) is in fact one of the main ingredients of Onsager’s
reciprocity relations for transport processes in systems close to equilibrium
[26].
The usual ergodic hypothesis, i.e. that the fraction of time spent by a
trajectority Xt in any region A on the energy surface H(X) = E is equal
to the fraction of the volume occupied by A, also seems like a natural as-
sumption for macroscopic systems. It is however not necessary for identifying
equilibrium properties of macroscopic systems with those obtained from the
microcanonical ensemble; see Section 7. Neither is it in any way sufficient for
explaining the approach to equilibrium observed in real systems: the time
scales are entirely different.
It should perhaps be emphasized again here that an important ingredient
in the whole picture of the time evolution of macrostates described above is
the constancy in time of the Liouville volume of sets in the phase space Γ as
they evolve under the Hamiltonian dynamics (Liouville’s Theorem). Without
this invariance the connection between phase space volume and probability
would be impossible or at least very problematic.
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For a somewhat different viewpoint on the issues discussed in this section
the reader is referred to Chapter IV in [13].
4 Initial Conditions
Once we accept the statistical explanation of why macroscopic systems evolve
in a manner that makes SB increase with time, there remains the nagging
problem (of which Boltzmann was well aware) of what we mean by “with
time”: since the microscopic dynamical laws are symmetric, the two direc-
tions of the time variable are a priori equivalent and thus must remain so
a posteriori. This was well expressed by Schro¨dinger [27]. “First, my good
friend, you state that the two directions of your time variable, from −t to
+t and from +t to −t are a priori equivalent. Then by fine arguments ap-
pealing to common sense you show that disorder (or ‘entropy’) must with
overwhelming probability increase with time. Now, if you please, what do
you mean by ‘with time’? Do you mean in the direction −t to +t? But
if your interferences are sound, they are equally valid for the direction +t
to −t. If these two directions are equivalent a priori, then they remain so
a posteriori. The conclusions can never invalidate the premise. Then your
inference is valid for both directions of time, and that is a contradiction.”
In terms of our Fig. 1 this question may be put as follows:f why can we
use phase space arguments (or time asymmetric diffusion type equations) to
predict the macrostate at time t of an isolated system whose macrostate at
time tb is Mb, in the future, i.e. for t > tb, but not in the past, i.e. for t < tb?
After all, if the macrostate M is invariant under velocity reversal of all the
atoms, then the same prediction should apply equally to tb + τ and tb − τ .
A plausible answer to this question is to assume that the nonequilibrium
macrostate Mb had its origin in an even more nonuniform macrostate Ma,
prepared by some experimentalist at some earlier time ta < tb (as is indeed
the case in Figure 1) and that for states thus prepared we can apply our
(approximately) equal a priori probability of microstates argument, i.e. we
can assume its validity at time ta. But what about events on the sun or in
a supernova explosion where there are no experimentalists? And what, for
that matter, is so special about the status of the experimentalist? Isn’t he
fThe reader should think of Fig. 1 as representing energy density in a solid: the darker
the hotter. The time evolution of the macrostate will then be given by the heat (diffusion)
equation.
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or she part of the physical universe?
Before trying to answer these “big” questions let us consider whether
the assignment of equal probabilities for X ∈ ΓMa at ta permits the use
of an equal probability distribution of X ∈ ΓMb at time tb for predicting
macrostates at times t > tb > ta when the system is isolated for t > ta. Note
that those microstates in ΓMb which have come from ΓMa through the time
evolution during the time interval from ta to tb make up a set Γab whose
volume |Γab| is by Liouville’s theorem at most equal
g to |ΓMa|; which, as
already discussed before, is only a very small fraction of the volume of ΓMb .
Thus we have to show that the overwhelming majority of phase points in Γab
(with respect to Liouville measure on Γab), have future macrostates like those
typical of Γb—while still being very special and unrepresentative of ΓMb as far
as their past macrostates are concerned. This property is explicitly proven
by Lanford in his derivation of the Boltzmann equation (for short times) [17],
and is part of the derivation of hydrodynamic equations [18], [19]; see also
[28].
To see intuitively the origin of this property we note that for systems with
realistic interactions the phase space region Γab ⊂ ΓMb will be so convoluted
as to appear uniformly smeared out in ΓMb. It is therefore reasonable that the
future behavior of the system, as far as macrostates go, will be unaffected by
their past history. It would of course be nice to prove this in all cases, “thus
justifying” (for practical purposes) the factorization or “Stosszahlansatz”
assumed by Boltzmann in deriving his dilute gas kinetic equation for all times
t > ta, not only for the short times proven by Lanford [17]. However, our
mathematical abilities are equal to this task only in very simple models such
as the Lorentz gas in a Sinai billiard. This model describes the evolution of a
macroscopic system of independent particles moving according to Newtonian
dynamics in a periodic array of scatterers. For this system one can actually
derive a diffusion equation for the macroscopic density profile n(r, t) from
the Hamiltonian dynamics [18]; see Section 8.
g|Γab| may be strictly less than |ΓMa | because some of the phase points in ΓMa may
not go into ΓMb . There will be approximate equality when Ma at time ta, determines Mb
at time tb: say via the diffusion equation for the energy density. This corresponds to the
“Markov case” discussed in [13]. There are of course situations where the macrostate at
time t, depends also (weakly or even strongly) on the whole history of M in some time
interval prior to t, e.g. in materials with memory. The second law certainly holds also for
these cases - with the appropriate definition of SB, obtained in many case by just refining
the description so that the new macro variables follow autonomous laws [13].
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This behavior can also be seen explicitely in a many particle system,
each of which evolves independently according to the reversible and area
preserving baker’s transformation (which can be thought of as a toy version
of the above case) see [29]. Here the phase space Γ for N particles is the
2N dimensional unit hypercube, i.e. X corresponds to specifying N -points
(x1, y1, . . . , xN , yN) in the unit square. The discrete time evolution is given
by
(xi, yi)→
{
(2xi,
1
2
yi), 0 ≤ xi <
1
2
(2xi − 1,
1
2
yi +
1
2
), xi ≤
1
2
< 1
.
Dividing the unit square into 4k little squares δα, α = 1, . . . , K,K = 4
k,
of side lengths 2−k, we define the macrostate M by giving the fraction of
particles pα = (Nα/N) in each δα within some tolerence. The Boltzmann
entropy is then given, using (1) and setting k = 1, by
SB =
∑
α
log
[
δNα
Nα!
]
≃ −N
∑
α
[
−1 + p(α) log
p(α)
δ
]
,
where p(α) = Nα/N, δ = |δα| = 4
−k, and we have used Stirling’s formula
appropriate for Nα >> 1. Letting now N → ∞ followed by K → ∞ we
obtain
N−1SB → −
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
f¯(x, y) log f¯(x, y)dxdy + 1
where f¯(x, y) is the smoothed density, p(α) ∼ f¯ δ, which behaves according
to the second law. In particular pt(α) will approach the equilibrium state
corresponding to peq(α) = 4
−k while the empirical density ft will approach
one in the unit square [29]. N. B. If we had considered instead the Gibbs
entropy SG, N
−1SG = −
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
0
f1 log f1dxdy, with f1(x, y) the marginal, i.e.
reduced, one particle distribution, then this would not change with time. See
section 7 and [2].
5 Velocity Reversal
The large number of atoms present in a macroscopic system plus the chaotic
nature of the dynamics “of all realistic systems” also explains why it is so
difficult, essentially impossible, for a clever experimentalist to deliberately
put such a system in a microstate which will lead it to evolve in isolation, for
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any significant time τ , in a way contrary to the second law.h Such microstates
certainly exist—just reverse all velocities Fig. 1b. In fact, they are readily
created in the computer simulations with no round off errors, see Fig. 2 and 3.
To quote again from Thomson’s article [4]: “If we allowed this equalization to
proceed for a certain time, and then reversed the motions of all the molecules,
we would observe a disequalization. However, if the number of molecules is
very large, as it is in a gas, any slight deviation from absolute precision in the
reversal will greatly shorten the time during which disequalization occurs.”
It is to be expected that this time interval decreases with the increase of the
chaoticity of the dynamics. In addition, if the system is not perfectly isolated,
as is always the case for real systems, the effect of unavoidable small outside
influences, which are unimportant for the evolution of macrostates in which
|ΓM | is increasing, will greatly destabilize evolution in the opposite direction
when the trajectory has to be aimed at a very small region of the phase space.
The last statement is based on the very reasonable assumption that al-
most any small outside perturbation of an “untypical” microstate X ∈ ΓM(X)
will tend to change it to a microstate Y ∈ ΓM(X) whose future time evolution
is typical of ΓM(X), i.e. Y will likely be a typical point in ΓM(X) so that typi-
cal behavior is not affected by the perturbation [14]. If however we are, as in
Figure 1, in a micro-state Xb at time tb, where Xb = TτXa, τ = tb − ta > 0,
with |ΓMb| >> |ΓMa|, and we now reverse all velocities, then RXb will be
heading towards a smaller phase space volume during the interval (tb, tb+ τ)
and this behavior is very untypical of ΓMb. The velocity reversal therefore
requires “perfect aiming” and will, as noted by Thomson [4], very likely be
derailed by even small imperfections in the reversal and/or tiny outside in-
fluences. After a very short time interval τ ′ << τ , in which SB decreases,
the imperfections in the reversal and the “outside” perturbations, such as
those coming from a sun flare, a star quake in a distant galaxy (a long time
ago) or from a butterfly beating its wings [14], will make it increase again.
This is clearly illustrated in Fig. 3, which shows how a small perturbation
has no effect on the forward macro evolution, but completely destroys the
time reversed evolution.
The situation is somewhat analogous to those pinball machine type puz-
zles where one is supposed to get a small metal ball into a small hole. You
have to do things just right to get it in but almost any vibration gets it out
hI am not considering here entropy increase of the experimentalist and experimental
apparatus directly associated with creating such a state.
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into larger regions. For the macroscopic systems we are considering, the dis-
parity between relative sizes of the comparable regions in the phase space is
unimaginably largere than in the puzzle, as noted in the example in Section
1. In the absence of any “grand conspiracy”, the behavior of such systems
can therefore be confidently predicted to be in accordance with the second
law (except possibly for very short time intervals). This is the reason why
even in those special cases such as spin-echo type experiments where the cre-
ation of an effective RTτX is possible, the “anti-second law” trajectory lasts
only for a short time [30]. In addition the total entropy change in the whole
process, including that in the apparatus used to affect the spin reversal, is
always positive in accord with the second law.
6 Cosmological Considerations
Let us return now to the big question posed earlier: what is special about ta
in Fig. 1 compared to tb in a world with symmetric microscopic laws? Put
differently, where ultimately do initial conditions, such as those assumed at
ta, come from? In thinking about this we are led more or less inevitably to
introduce cosmological considerations by postulating an initial “macrostate
of the universe” having a very small Boltzmann entropy, (see also 1e and
1f). To again quote Boltzmann [31]: “That in nature the transition from a
probable to an improbable state does not take place as often as the converse,
can be explained by assuming a very improbable [small SB] initial state of
the entire universe surrounding us. This is a reasonable assumption to make,
since it enables us to explain the facts of experience, and one should not
expect to be able to deduce it from anything more fundamental”. While this
requires that the initial macrostate of the universe, call it M0, be very far
from equilibrium with |ΓM0 | << |ΓMeq |, it does not require that we choose
a special microstate in ΓM0. As also noted by Boltzmann elsewhere “we
do not have to assume a special type of initial condition in order to give a
mechanical proof of the second law, if we are willing to accept a statistical
viewpoint...if the initial state is chosen at random...entropy is almost certain
to increase.” This is a very important aspect of Boltzmann’s insight, it is
sufficient to assume that this microstate is typical of an initial macrostate
M0 which is far from equilibrium.
This going back to the initial conditions, i.e. the existence of an early
state of the universe (presumably close to the big bang) with a much lower
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Figure 4: With a gas in a box, the maximum entropy state (thermal equilib-
rium) has the gas distributed uniformly; however, with a system of gravitat-
ing bodies, entropy can be increased from the uniform state by gravitational
clumping leading eventually to a black hole. From Ref. [16].
value of SB than the present universe, as an ingredient in the explanation of
the observed time asymmetric behavior, bothers some physicists. It really
shouldn’t since the initial state of the universe plus the dynamics determines
what is happening at present. Conversely, we can deduce information about
the initial state from what we observe now. As put by Feynman [15], “it
is necessary to add to the physical laws the hypothesis that in the past the
universe was more ordered, in the technical sense, [i.e. low SB] than it is
today...to make an understanding of the irreversibility.” A very clear dis-
cussion of this is given by Roger Penrose in connection with the “big bang”
cosmology [16]. He takes for the initial macrostate of the universe the smooth
energy density state prevalent soon after the big bang: an equilibrium state
(at a very high temperature) except for the gravitational degrees of free-
dom which were totally out of equilibrium, as evidenced by the fact that the
matter-energy density was spatially very uniform. That such a uniform den-
sity corresponds to a nonequilibrium state may seem at first surprising, but
gravity, being purely attractive and long range, is unlike any of the other fun-
damental forces. When there is enough matter/energy around, it completely
overcomes the tendency towards uniformization observed in ordinary objects
at high energy densities or temperatures. Hence, in a universe dominated,
like ours, by gravity, a uniform density corresponds to a state of very low
entropy, or phase space volume, for a given total energy, see Fig. 4.
19
Figure 5: The creator locating the tiny region of phase-space—one part in
1010
123
—needed to produce a 1080-baryon closed universe with a second law of
thermodynamics in the form we know it. From Ref. [16]. If the initial state
was chosen randomly it would, with overwhelming probability, have led to a
universe in a state with maximal entropy. In such a universe there would be
no stars, planets, people or a second law.
The local ‘order’ or low entropy we see around us (and elsewhere)—
from complex molecules to trees to the brains of experimentalists prepar-
ing macrostates—is perfectly consistent with (and possibly even a necessary
consequence of, i.e. typical of) this initial macrostate of the universe. The
value of SB at the present time, tp, corresponding to SB(Mtp) of our current
clumpy macrostate describing a universe of planets, stars, galaxies, and black
holes, is much much larger than SB(M0), the Boltzmann entropy of the “ini-
tial state”, but still quite far away from SB(Meq) its equilibrium value. The
‘natural’ or ‘equilibrium’ state of the universe, Meq, is, according to Penrose
[16], one with all matter and energy collapsed into one big black hole. Pen-
rose gives an estimate SB(M0)/SB(Mtp)/Seq ∼ 10
88/10101/10123 in natural
(Planck) units, see Fig. 5. (So we may still have a long way to go.)
I find Penrose’s consideration about the very far from equilibrium uniform
density initial state quite plausible, but it is obviously far from proven. In
any case it is, as Feynman says, both necessary and sufficient to assume a
far from equilibrium initial state of the universe, and this is in accord with
all cosmological evidence. The question as to why the universe started out
in such a very unusual low entropy initial state worries R. Penrose quite a
lot (since it is not explained by any current theory) but such a state is just
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accepted as a given by Boltzmann. My own feelings are in between. It would
certainly be nice to have a theory which would explain the “cosmological
initial state” but I am not holding my breath. Of course, if one believes
in the “anthopic principle” in which there are many universes and ours just
happens to be right or we would not be here then there is no problem – but
I don’t find this very convincing [32].
7 Boltzmann vs. Gibbs Entropies
The Boltzmannian approach, which focuses on the evolution of a single
macroscopic system, is conceptually different from what is commonly referred
to as the Gibbsian approach, which focuses primarily on probability distri-
butions or ensembles. This difference shows up strikingly when we compare
Boltzmann’s entropy—defined in (1) for a microstate X of a macroscopic
system—with the more commonly used (and misused) entropy SG of Gibbs,
defined for an ensemble density ρ(X) by
SG({ρ}) = −k
∫
ρ(X)[log ρ(X)]dX. (3)
Here ρ(X)dX is the probability (obtained some way or other) for the micro-
scopic state of the system to be found in the phase space volume element dX
and the integral is over the phase space Γ. Of course if we take ρ(X) to be
the generalized microcanonical ensemble associated with a macrostate M ,
ρM(X) ≡
{
|ΓM |
−1, if X ∈ ΓM
0, otherwise
, (4)
then clearly,
SG({ρM}) = k log |ΓM | = SB(M). (5)
The probability density ρMeq for a system in the equilibrium macrostate
Meq is, as already noted, essentially the same as that for the microcanonical
(and equivalent also to the canonical or grandcanonical) ensemble when the
system is of macroscopic size. Generalized microcanonical ensembles ρM(X),
or their canonical versions, are also often used to describe systems in which
the particle density, energy density and momentum density vary slowly on
a microscopic scale and the system is, in each small macroscopic region, in
equilibrium with the prescribed local densities, i.e. in which we have local
equilibrium [18]. In such cases SG({ρM}) and SB(M) agree with each other,
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and with the macroscopic hydrodynamic entropy, to leading order in system
sized. (The ρM do not however describe the fluxes in such systems: the
average of J(X), the microscopic flux function, being zero for ρM [18].)
The time evolutions of SB and SG subsequent to some initial time when
ρ = ρM are very different, unless M = Meq when there is no further system-
atic change in M or ρ. As is well known, it follows from the fact (Liouville’s
thoerem) that the volume of phase space regions remains unchanged under
the Hamiltonian time evolution (even though their shape changes greatly)
that SG({ρ}) never changes in time as long as X evolves according to the
Hamiltonian evolution, i.e. ρ evolves according to the Liouville equation.
SB(M), on the other hand, certainly does change. Thus, if we consider the
evolution of the microcanonical ensemble corresponding to the macrostate
Ma in Fig. 1a after removal of the constraint, SG would equal SB initially
but subsequently SB would increase while SG would remain constant. SG
therefore does not give any indication that the system is evolving towards
equilibrium.
This reflects the fact, discussed earlier, that the probabililty density ρt(X)
does not remain uniform over the domain corresponding to the macrostate
Mt = M(Xt) for t > 0. I am thinking here of the case in which Mt evolves
deterministicaly so that almost all X initially in ΓM0 will be in ΓMt at time
t, c.f. [2]. As long as the system remains truly isolated ρt(X) will contain
memories of the initial ρ0 in the higher order correlations, which are reflected
in the complicated shape which an initial region ΓM0 takes on in time but
which do not affect the future time evolution of M (see the discussion at end
of section 4). Thus the relevant entropy for understanding the time evolution
of macroscopic systems is SB and not SG.
Of course, if we do, at each time t, a “coarse graining” of ρ over the
cell ΓMt then we are essentially back to dealing with ρMt , and we are just
defining SB in a backhanded way. This is one of the standard ways, used in
many textbooks, of reconciling the constancy of SG with the behavior of the
entropy in real systems. I fail to see what is gained by this except to obscure
the fact that the microstate of a system is specified at any instant of time by
a single phase point Xt and that its evolution in time is totally independent
of how well we know the actual value of Xt. Why not use SB from the
beginning? We can of course still use ensembles for computations. They will
yield correct results whenever the quantities measured, which may involve
averages over some time interval τ , have small dispersion in the ensemble
considered.
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8 Quantitative Macroscopic Evolution
Let me now describe briefly the very important but very daunting task of
actually rigorously deriving time asymmetric hydrodynamic equations from
reversible microscopic laws [18], [19]. While many qualitative features of
irreversible macroscopic behavior depend very little on the positivity of Lya-
punov exponents, ergodicity, or mixing properties of the microscopic dynam-
ics, such properties are important for the existence of a quantitative descrip-
tion of the macroscopic evolution via time-asymmetric autonomous equations
of hydrodynamic type. The existence and form of such equations depend on
the rapid decay of correlations in space and time, which requires chaotic
dynamics. When the chaoticity can be proven to be strong enough (and of
the right form) such equations can be derived rigorously from the reversible
microscopic dynamics by taking limits in which the ratio of macroscopic to
microscopic scales goes to infinity. Using the law of large numbers one shows
that these equations describe the behavior of almost all individual systems
in the ensemble, not just that of ensemble averages, i.e. that the dispersion
goes to zero in the scaling limit. The equations also hold, to a high accuracy,
when the macro/micro ratio is finite but very large [18].
As already mentioned, an example in which this can be worked out in
detail is the periodic Lorentz gas. This consists of a macroscopic number
of non-interacting particles moving among a periodic array of fixed convex
scatterers, arranged in the plane in such a way that there is a maximum dis-
tance a particle can travel between collisions (finite horizon Sinai billiard).
The chaotic nature of the microscopic dynamics, which leads on microscopic
time scales to an approximately isotropic local distribution of velocities, is
directly responsible for the existence of a simple autonomous deterministic
description, via a diffusion equation, for the macroscopic particle density pro-
file of this system [18]. A second example is a system of hard spheres at very
low densities for which the Boltzmann equation has been shown to describe
(at least for short times) [17] the evolution of ft(r,v), the empirical density
in the six dimensional position and velocity space. I use these examples,
despite their highly idealized nature, because here (and unfortunately only
here) all the mathematical i’s have been dotted. They thus show ipso facto,
in a way that should convince even (as Mark Kac put it) an “unreasonable”
person, not only that there is no conflict between reversible microscopic and
irreversible macroscopic behavior but also that, in these cases at least, for
almost all initial microscopic states consistent with a given nonequilibrium
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macroscopic state, the latter follows from the former—in complete accord
with Boltzmann’s ideas.
9 Quantum Mechanics
While the above analysis was done, following Maxwell, Thomson and Boltz-
mann, in terms of classical mechanics, the situation is in many ways similar
in quantum mechanics. Formally the reversible incompressible flow in phase
space is replaced by the unitary evolution of wave functions in Hilbert space
and velocity reversal of X by complex conjugation of the wavefunction Ψ.
In particular, I do not believe that quantum measurement is a new source
of irreversibility. Rather, real measurements on quantum systems are time-
asymmetric because they involve, of necessity, systems with a very large
number of degrees of freedom whose irreversibility can be understood using
natural extensions of classical ideas [33]. There are however also some gen-
uinely new features in quantum mechanics relevant to our problem; for a
more complete discussion see [34].
Similarities
Let me begin with the similarities. The analogue of the Gibbs entropy of
an ensemble, Eq (3), is the well known von Neumann entropy of a density
matrix µˆ,
SˆvN(µˆ) = −kTrµˆ log µˆ. (6)
This entropy, like the classical SG(ρ), does not change in time for an isolated
system evolving under the Schro¨dinger time evolution [13], [35]. Furthermore
it has the value zero whenever µˆ represents a pure state. It is thus, like
SG(ρ), not appropriate for describing the time asymmetric behavior of an
isolated macroscopic system. We therefore naturally look for the analog of
the Boltzmann entropy given by Eq (1). We shall see that while the quantum
version of (1b) is straight forward there is no strict analog of (1a) with X
replaced by Ψ which holds for all Ψ.
In a surprisingly little quoted part of his famous book on quantum me-
chanics [35], von Neumann discusses what he calls the macroscopic entropy
of a system. To begin with, von Neumann describes a macrostate M of a
macroscopic quantum systemi by specifying the values of a set of “rounded
ivon Neumann unfortunately does not always make a clear distinction between systems
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off” commuting macroscopic observables, i.e. operators Mˆ , representing par-
ticle number, energy, etc., in each of the cells into which the box containing
the system is divided (within some tolerence). Labeling the set of eigenval-
ues of the Mˆ by Mα, α = 1, ..., one then has, corresponding to the collection
{Mα}, an orthogonal decomposition of the system’s Hilbert space H into
linear subspaces Γˆα in which the observables Mˆ take the values of Mα. (We
use here the subscript α to avoid confusion with the operators Mˆ .)
Calling Eα the projection into Γˆα, von Neumann then defines the macro-
scopic entropy of a system with a density matrix; µˆ as,
Sˆmac(µˆ) = k
L∑
α=1
pα(µˆ) log |Γˆα| − k
L∑
α=1
pα(µˆ) log pα(µˆ) (7)
where pα(µˆ) is the probability of finding the system with density matrix µˆ
in the macrostate Mα,
pα(µˆ) = Tr(Eαµˆ), (8)
and |Γˆα| is the dimension of Γˆα (Eq (6) is at the bottom of p 411 in [35]; see
also Eq (4) in [36]). An entirely analogous definition is made for a system
represented by a wavefunction Ψ: we simply replace pα(µˆ) in (7) and (8) by
pα(Ψ) = (Ψ, EαΨ). In fact |Ψ >< Ψ| just corresponds, as is well known, to
a particular (pure) density matrix µˆ.
Von Neumann justifies (7) by noting that
Sˆmac(µˆ) = −kTr[µ˜ log µ˜] = SvN (µ˜) (9)
for
µ˜ =
∑
(pα/|Γˆα|)Eα (10)
and that µ˜ is macroscopically indistinguishable from µˆ. This is analogous
to the classical “coarse graining” discussed at the end of section 7, with
µ˜α = Eα/|Γˆα| ↔ ρMα there.
It seems natural to make the correspondence between the partitioning of
classical phase space Γ and the decomposition of the Hilbert space H and to
define the natural quantum analogue to Boltzmann’s definition of SB(M) in
(1), as
SˆB(Mα) = k log |ΓˆMα| (11)
of macroscopic size and those consisting of only a few particles and this leads I believe to
much confusion, c.f. article by Kemble [36]. See also articles by Bocchieri and Loinger
[37], who say it correctly.
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where |ΓˆM | is the dimension of ΓˆM . This is in fact done more or less ex-
plicitely in [35], [37], [13], [38] and is clearly consistent with the standard
prescription for computing the von Neumann quantum entropy of an equilib-
rium systems, with µˆ = µˆeq, where µˆeq is the microcanonical density matrix;
µˆeq ∼ µ˜α, corresponding toMα = Meq. This was in fact probably standard at
one time but since forgotten. In this case the right side of (11) is, to leading
order in the size of the system, equal to the von Neumann entropy computed
from the microcanonical density matrix (as it is for classical systems) [13].
With this definition of SˆB(M), the first term on the right side of equation
(7) is just what we would intuitively write down for the expected value of
the entropy of a classical system of whose macrostate we were unsure, e.g.
if we saw a pot of water on the burner and made some guess, described by
the probability distribution pα, about its temperature or energy. The second
term in (7) will be negligible compared to the first term for a macroscopic
system, classical or quantum, going to zero when divided by the number of
particles in the system.
One can give arguments for expecting SˆB(Mt) to increase (or stay con-
stant) with t after a constraint is lifted in a macroscopic system until the
system reaches the macrostate Meq [38]. [37], [34]. These arguments are on
the heuristic conceptual level analogous to those given above for classical
systems, although there are at present no worked out examples analogous to
those described in the last section. This will hopefully be remedied in the
near future.
Differences
We come now to the differences between the classical and quantum pic-
tures. While in the classical case the actual state of the system is described
by X ∈ Γα, for some α, so that the system is always definitely in one of the
macrostatesMα, this is not so for a quantum system specified by µˆ or Ψ. We
thus do not have the analog of (1a) for general µˆ or Ψ. In fact, even when
the system is in a microstate µˆ or Ψ corresponding to a definite macrostate
at time t0, only a classical system will always be in a unique macrostate for
all times t. The quantum system may evolve to a superposition of differ-
ent macrostates, as happens in the well known Schro¨dinger cat paradox: a
wave function Ψ corresponding to a particular macrostate evolves into a lin-
ear combination of wavefunctions associated with very different macrostates,
one corresponding to a live and one to a dead cat (see references [38] - [41]).
The possibility of superposition of wavefunctions is of course a general,
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one might say the central, feature of quantum mechanics. It is reflected
here by the fact that whereas the relevant classical phase space can be par-
titioned into cells ΓM such that every X belongs to exactly one cell, i.e.
every microstate corresponds to a unique macrostate, this is not so in quan-
tum mechanics. The superposition principle rules out any such meaningful
partition of the Hilbert space: all we have is an orthogonal decomposition.
Thus one cannot associate a definite macroscopic state to an arbitrary wave
function of the system. This in turn raises questions about the connection
between the quantum formalism and our picture of reality, questions which
are very much part of the fundamental issues concerning the interpretation
of quantum mechanics as a theory of events in the real world; see [16], and
[38]–[44] and references there for a discussion of these problems.
Another related difference between classical and quantum mechanics is
that quantum correlations between separated systems arising from wave func-
tion entanglement render very problematic, in general, our assigning a wave
function to a subsystem S1 of a system S consisting of parts S1, and S2
even when there is no direct interaction between S1 and S2. This makes
the standard idealization of physics— an isolated system—much more prob-
lematical in quantum mechanics than in classical theory. In fact any system,
considered as a subsystem of the universe described by some wavefunction Ψ,
will in general not be described by a wavefunction but by a density matrix,
µΨ = Tr|Ψ >< Ψ| where the trace is over S2.
It turns out that for a small system coupled to a large system, which may
be considered as a heat bath, the density matrix of the small system will
be the canonical one, µˆs = µˆβ ∼ exp[−βHˆs] [45], [46]. To be more precise,
assume that the (small) system plus heat bath (s + B) are described by a
microcanonical ensemble, specified by giving a uniform distribution over all
normalized wave functions Ψ of (s+B) in an energy shell (E,E+δE). Then
the reduced density matrix of the system µˆs = TrB|Ψ >< Ψ| obtained from
any typical Ψ will be close to µˆβ, i.e. the difference between them will go
to zero (in the trace norm) as the number of degrees of freedom in the bath
goes to infinity. This is a remarkable property of quantum systems which has
no classical analogue. All one can say classically is that if one averges over
the microstates of the bath one gets the canonical Gibbs distribution for the
system. This is of course also true and well known for quantum systems, but
what is new is that this is actually true for almost all pure states Ψ, [45],
[46] see also references there to earlier work in that direction, including [37].
One can even go further and find the dsitribution of the “wave function”
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ϕ of the small system described by µˆβ [47]. For ways of giving meaning to
the wavefunction of a subsystem, see [41] - [42] and [48].
10 Final Remarks
As I stated in the beginning, I have here completely ignored relativity, special
or general. The phenomenon we wish to explain, namely the time-asymmetric
behavior of macroscopic objects, has certainly many aspects which are the
same in the relativistic (real) universe as in a (model) non-relativistic one.
The situation is of course very different when we consider the entropy of black
holes and the nature of the appropriate initial cosmological state where rela-
tivity is crucial. Similarly the questions about the nature of time mentioned
in the beginning of this article cannot be discussed meaningfully without
relativity. Such considerations may yet lead to entirely different pictures of
the nature of reality and may shed light on the interpretation of quantum
mechanics, discussed in the last section, c.f. [16]. Still it is my belief that
one can and in fact one must, in order to make any scientific progress, iso-
late segments of reality for separate analysis. It is only after the individual
parts are understood, on their own terms, that one can hope to synthesize a
complete picture.
To conclude, I believe that the Maxwell-Thomson-Boltzmann resolution
of the problem of the origin of macroscopic irreversibility contains, in the sim-
plest idealized classical context, the essential ingredients for understanding
this phenomena in real systems. Abandoning Boltzmann’s insights would,
as Schro¨dinger saysj be a most serious scientific regression. I have yet to see
any good reason to doubt Schro¨dinger’s assessment.
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